1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
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fled the capital before its fall, and the Western soldiers plundered and looted the city far more devastatingly than they had forty years earlier. Tientsin had suffered a like visitation a month earlier. The further cost to China of the Boxer Rebellion included the payment of an indemnity to the offended nations -- the United States' share being later converted into a scholarship fund for Chinese students to study in America -- and the stationing of foreign troops in Peking with the right to police the area from the capital to the sea. Foreign garrisons continued to exercise these rights until forced out of the capital by the Chinese Communists.

E. Government by Military Force

The example of Japan's defeat of Russia following on China's humiliation as a consequence of the Boxer Rebellion swelled reform sentiment throughout the nation. By 1911, a national assembly was sitting in Peking. Although constituted by the throne to assure the conservative nature of the advisory body, it was proving more progressive minded than the dynasty and more demanding than advisory. Before the real intentions of the dynasty were put to the test, revolution broke out along the Yangtze River and immediately spread to the South. Very little sympathetic response came

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642 669 from Hopei and Shansi.[19]

The most powerful and modern military force in China at the time, the Pei-yang Army, remained loyal to the throne. The staff officers of the army were even more loyal to Yüan Shih-k'ai, who had organized and trained the force while governor of Hopei. Called out of enforced retirement to save the Manchu Dynasty, he used the Pei-yang Army to contain the revolutionary forces. At the same time, Yüan advanced his own ambitions as negotiator for the ruling house with the 642 revolutionaries. An agreement was finally reached in February 1912 by which the Manchus abdicated the throne and transferred the central governing power to Yüan. He was able to win the approval of the republican leader, Sun Yat-sen, who persuaded the provisional assembly convened at Nanking to elect Yüan president of the Republic of China with its capital at Nanking.

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19. On the nature and progress of the 1911 Revolution see Fairbank and Teng, op. cit., pp. 193-229 and passim; and H. F. MacNair, China in Revolution: An Analysis of Politics and Militarism under the Republic, Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1931, pp. 1-45.

642 Yüan refused to budge from his base of power in Peking. The provisional assembly, intent on exercising the real power in the government, reluctantly moved to Peking to limit the actions of the new and distrusted president. At his own base of power, however, Yüan was invulnerable. When the parliament refused to bend to his will, he brought about the dissolution of the body in 1913 and its permanent suspension at the beginning of 1914.

Thereafter, he restored Confucianism and the worship of heaven as state cults, established peace and order by strong-arm methods, and consolidated his personal power. Having become president for life in 1914, he attempted to make himself emperor. This move led to the defection of six provinces south of the Yangtze River and their organization of a rival government. Yüan was in the midst of trying to undo his folly when he died in June 1916.

F. Warlord Rule

642 With Yüan's death, his staff officers in
701 North China and military leaders elsewhere
681 made a bid for dominance over all or parts of China. Motivated largely by the desire for power and wealth, none attracted a popular following or was able to restore unity and centralized government to China.[20]

20. On the warlords see MacNair, op. cit., pp. 46-64 and passim.

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631 Peking was a primary attraction to these military despots. It was still the national capital of the Republic and carried on the fiction of governing China. Through control of the phantom government at Peking, various warlords were able to enrich themselves by arranging loans from Japan in return for favors that sacrificed China's interests.

Most notorious of the warlord rulers of Peking was Tuan Ch'i-jui. A former staff officer of the Pei-yang Army and premier under Yüan, he retained the latter position after Yüan's death and controlled the central government through leadership of a military faction called the Anfu Clique (an for Anhwei and peace, fu for Fukien and good fortune). His dominance of the government was alternately shared with or disputed by two other similar groups: the Chihli (Hopei) Clique headed by Ts'ao K'un, later by Wu P'ei-fu; and the Fengtien (South Manchuria) Clique led by Chang Tso-lin, after 1928 by his son Chang Hsüeh-liang. From 1923, Feng Yü-hsiang, until then the chief lieutenant of Wu P'ei-fu, become an independent and additional element in the dominance of Peking. In consort, the warlords ousted from Peking the 1911 parliamentary rule.

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668 While Hopei and the capital were experiencing almost constant warfare and

642 changes in governing personnel, Shansi was
701 held firmly by Yen Hsi-shan. A native of
631 the province, he had controlled it since
668 becoming military governor under Yüan Shih-k'ai. After the Kuomintang armies embarked on the Northern Expedition to unite all China, Yen temporarily cast in his lot with the movement. His seizure of Peking in June 1928 under the revolutionary banner marked the last step in the Kuomintang's nominal unification of China. On June 21, the name of the capital of China for almost 650 years was changed from Peking to Peiping (actually from Pei-ching or Northern Capital to Pei-p'ing or Northern Peace), and Nanking (Nan-ching or Southern Capital) was made the political center of China.

642 The nominal unification of the country
701 did not bring an end to turmoil in the northern
631 provinces nor their subservience to the Nanking Government. Yen retained his control over Shansi and made a bid for dominance of Hopei as well. In ephemeral alliances with or against Feng Yü-hsiang, Chang Hsüeh-liang, and the Kuomintang, he continued the struggle until Chang committed himself to the Nationalist Government in 1930. The Fengtien leader eliminated his rivals from Hopei with the help of Nanking and was given command of the area between the Great Wall and the Yellow River as well as the task of bringing his domain in Manchuria into closer alignment with the

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642 central government. Real power in Shansi,
701 however, remained in the hands of Yen Hsi-shan,
631 and he was eliminated from the province only after World War II by the Communist armies.

G. North China and Japan

167 Toward the end of the second decade
631 of the twentieth century, a significant change
648 occurred in the frontier region north and northeast of Shansi and Hopei. The opening of modern rail and road systems stimulated mass migrations from the North China Region (and Shantung) into Inner Mongolia and, on a far larger scale, into Manchuria. As soon as the Nationalist Government was established in October 1928, it created the provinces of Suiyuan, Chahar, and Jehol out of Inner Mongolia and made them part of the Chinese administrative system. Soon afterward, the Nanking regime made strenuous efforts to establish economic dominance in the new provinces and Manchuria.[21]

648 These moves threatened Japan's whole position in East Asia. Japan had been

21. See Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 13-18, H.B. Morse and H.F. MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931, pp. 727, 758-60; and George H. Blakesless and Harold S. Quigley, The Far East, An International Survey, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1938, pp. 8-122.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
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Nanking to permit the establishment of the East Hopei Autonomous Council and the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. Although the personnel of these governments was named by Nanking, their creation undermined the Nationalist Government's sovereignity and control while increasing Japan's military, political, and economic dominance of North China. This was the situation in July 1937 when Japanese troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area clashed with Chinese troops in Lu-kou-ch'iao outside Peiping and precipitated the war of resistance against Japan.[22]

Although China had considerable armed strength in the North when Japan launched a full-scale attack, no determined resistance took place in Hopei and Shansi as developed around Shanghai in the early months of the war. By the end of 1937, the main campaign in the two provinces and Inner Mongolia was completed.[23] The Provisional Government of the Republic of China was established as a puppet regime at Peking in December 1937 with jurisdiction over

22. T.A. Bisson, Japan in China, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1938, pp. 1-153, 290-316.

23. Ibid.

1:Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
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Suiyuan, Chahar, Hopei, Shansi, and Shantung. When the Reformed Government was established at Nanking in March 1940 under Japanese tutelage, as the political authority for all China, the Provisional Government was sublimated into the North China Political Council to maintain semi-autonomy in the North China Region. In actuality, neither political unit had any real power, attracted no important Chinese leaders to their standards -- other than Wang Ching-wei, head of the Nanking puppet regime -- and derived no real support or recognition from the Chinese people.[24]

Japan, content with dominance in the large cities and along communication lines, did not attempt to control all of Shansi and Hopei. In the areas under their command, the Japanese promoted a revised form of Confucianism that had been worked out in Manchukuo and was calculated to both make the conquered people more subservient and given them a sense of continuity with the past. A New People's Association (Hsin-min-hui) was also set up with the intention of regimenting the populace and

24. George E. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 20-26, 31-32, 64-65, 151-56, 176, and passim; and Paul M. Linebarger, The China of Chiang K'ai-shek [sic]: A Political Study, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941, pp. 183-210.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China AF12

178 foreign firms or government services headed by
946 foreigners. Their prohibition against officers hiring or recommending relatives was only beginning to be copied by wholly Chinese institutions such as banks, factories, and schools in the years before World War II. Where the employment of relatives was forbidden, friendship, a common birthplace, training in the same school, or membership in the same secret society often provided the basis for a personal link between an employer and a prospective employee and for the rise of cliques in business and government offices.

Scattered surveys of various strata of the population in industrial areas indicate that only at the upper managerial or owner level, where the facts of economic operation were most pressing, was the majority in favor of impersonal, rational selection of employees. Even in modern colleges, only about half the students appeared to favor that choice. With each successively lower economic level, the preference was more overwhelmingly for selection on the basis of kinship.[7]

F. Effect on Social and Political Role

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With the collapse of the imperial system in 1912, the family was no longer fitted to serve

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7. Ibid., pp. 186-89.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China AF12

as the social and political training ground of China. The political parties and modern schools, particularly the colleges and universities, now began to train youth for the new political world which was coming into being after 1911. No comparable institutions existed to inculcate in youth a moral and ethical code that would serve as a common guide in the new society. Attempts by the Kuomintang leaders during the period of the National Government to restore filial piety along with a revised Confucian code to the service of an increasingly authoritarian-minded state met with failure among the nation's youth.[8]

IV. THE FAMILY UNDER COMMUNISM

A. The Marriage Law

In reconstructing Chinese society, the Communist regime has undertaken to change the nature and function of the family. The first step in this direction was the new Marriage Law promulgated in May 1950. It is one of the three legal pillars of the state. The other two -- the Labor Union Law and the Land Reform Law -- were announced at a later date but put into effect within a much shorter time and with greater success.

8. Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology," Far Eastern Quarterly, August, 1955, pp. 515-32.

671 Whatever the humanitarian by-products, the
593 Marriage Law aimed at a basic change in Chinese
642 society with two utilitarian purposes in view.
582 One was to change the popular basis of loyalty from the family to the state. The other was to free the Chinese woman from her preoccupation with the home and children so that she might become a laborer in the field and factory. These aims were quite openly expressed.

For instance, an article in the Peking Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao [China Youth] on the correct attitude toward parents, asserts that under the Confucian system with its emphasis on filial piety, parents had the right to regard their children as private property and demand sacrifices of them. Under the new system, the article points out, "children are not the private property of their parents, but belong first of all to the state and to the people, and ...the interests of the people should be the highest criterion governing our actions toward our parents."[13]

An editorial in the People's Daily in March 1955 notes that remnant feudal ideologies still obstructed "the participation of woman in socialist construction and various political activities." The editorial then goes on the state that it is in order to promote the political and production zeal of women that their rights must be promoted

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13. SCMP, 973, p. 31.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China AF12

671 and the Marriage Law implemented.[14] Various
642 comments on the Marriage Law inspired by the
593 regime stress Lenin's dictum that sex relation-
582 ships and family problems are not individual or small affairs but matters of great social, economic, and political significance.[15]

B. Implementation of the Marriage Law

671 As the Nationalist Government had made
582 no attempt to put into effect the marriage and
593 family provisions of its 1930-31 codes among the
369 rural population, the spirit and provisions of the Marriage Law were new and alien to this great majority of the Chinese people. They were still bound to the traditional family and had not encountered the economic experience and education which had pushed the family in Western-influenced cities toward new types of social organization from the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, the new law offered no immediate or apparent economic benefits as had the Land Reform Law.

671 The result was apathy, when not open re-
645 sistance, toward the reorientation of marriage
593 and family practices among the farming popu-
582 lation. These attitudes were as typical of most of the village cadres as of the rural people

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14. Ibid., 106, p. 15.

15. See, for instance, C.B., 275, p. 4; and SCMP, 1048, pp. 30-31.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
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635 of government policy in financial and economic matters. Another resolution supporting the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association and the alliance between the two nations was passed. Approximately 1,800 proposals were received. They can be classified as follows: concerning production and construction - 654; finance and economic s - 394; education, culture, and health - 385; political matters - 308; public safety - 66; military affairs - 9. Many of these proposals were combined until the total was reduced to 654. Of these proposals, those considered as future tasks or having to do with financial arrangements were grouped together for further study. Those which could be handled by the provincial government were submitted to the departments concerned. Only seven proposals were rejected as being against the laws and decrees of the Central People's Government.

IV. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STAGE

•642 666 An electoral law for the People's Congress on all levels was promulgated on March 1, 1953.

The National People's Congress scheduled for September 1954 was preceded by the

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666 election of deputies to the provincial, municipal,
• 642 county, and hsiang people's congresses.
According to the Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China, delegates to the National People's Congress and deputies to the people's congresses of a province, a county, and "a municipality divided into districts" shall be elected by the People's congress on the next lower level.

Before the convening of the National People's Congress, the provincial governments were busy with census-taking, registration of voters, direct elections of delegates to the congresses at the hsiang and municipality or municipal district levels, and meetings of these and succeedingly higher congresses as they were brought into being. On September 15, 1954, the National People's Congress met for the first time, and on September 20 the new Constitution was passed. In addition, a statute for the organization of the local People's congresses on all levels and the local People's councils was published. This statute delineated the structure of the provincial governments.

A. General Provisions Concerning the Provincial Government

635 Under the Constitution, the provincial governments have been placed on a new basis. Each province has the status of an administrative

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668 642 was as important as the liquidation of Nationalist spies. During 1951, church groups and foreign missionaries were accused of engaging in espionage, Mass meetings were held and anti-imperialism" propaganda was disseminated, An Italian. Antonio Riva, was arrested in Peking and charged with spying for the United States Government.[22] A militant Catholic organization in Tientsin known as Sheng-mu Chün (the Legion of Mary) was singled out for suppression.[23] Members of that organization were required to register and were subject to investigation by security agencies. Of the reported 20,000 Chinese Catholics in Peking, about 2 000 were said to have joined the Sheng-mu Chün and "other reactionary organizations."[24]

687 668 5. Sabotage. Sabotage cases involving the destruction of factory property, the theft of confidential information, and rumor-mongering were frequently reported in the North China Region. During 1950-52, acts of sabotage were fought by the enforcement of union control and by the organization of security committees in the factories and "safety" teams in the individual shops. With the launching of the first Five-Year Plan in 1953, regulations on safety and labor discipline were strengthened.[25] To observe labor

22. Ibid., Aug. 18, 1951, p. 3.

23. Text of order of Tientsin Military Control Committee, ibid., July 15, 1951, p. 1.

24. Ibid., Nov. 25, 1951, p. 4.

25. Text of "regulations on Labor Discipline Applied in State-Owned Enterprises," ibid., July 14, 1954, p. 2.

4: Burgess E-4.5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF1

It is not necessary in this study to give a detailed description of the ancient systems of Chinese government. S. Wells Williams,[1] H. B. Morse[2] and many others have outlined this ancient regime. The governmental structure had four main divisions: (1) the Emperor and the court; (2) a system of government boards and bureaus at Peking; (3) the provincial government composed of viceroy or governor and his staff of officials appointed by the central government; (4) the various subdivisions of the provincial government which have as their smallest governmental unit the *Hsien*, which has been variously translated as township or county. This *Hsien* was composed of a walled city which was the county seat for the surrounding rural area. The *Hsien* magistrate, or prefect, because of his close relations to the people, was known as the "Father and Mother of the People."[3] He was (1) the judge of the district, controlling the police, enforcing the law and punishing offenders, (2) the collector of taxes, (3) the registrar of lands and (4) the governmental famine commissioner who saw to it that in time of famine the people were fed from the public granaries, which it was his duty to keep well filled.

After reading any of the detailed descriptions of what these prefects were supposed to do, one would imagine that the people of China were ruled in every detail of their life by the county official. Earlier in this study[4] it has been shown, however, that the facts are just the opposite. Morse describes the actual situation in these words:

These are the principal functions of the Mayor of the Chinese

[1] S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom* (New York, 1907).

[2] Morse, *The Trade and Administration of China* (New York, 1913).

[3] Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[4] *Cf.*, pp. 26-27.

4: Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12

CHAPTER XIV

PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES

In dealing with the probable future of the guilds the conclusion indicated was that with the possible exception of the professional type these organizations, in their present structural form, will eventually disappear. A question of perhaps greater importance is whether the values of the old institutions already described will also disappear when formal organization disintegrates or is transmuted, or whether certain of the values of the old guilds will be incorporated in the new industrial and commercial life. Is such a synthesis possible?[1]

[1] There are evidences in other phases of the contemporary cultural transformation in China that such a synthesis of the values and methods of East and West is being achieved.

The article written by Professor J. B. Taylor on "Denmark and Rural China" (*Chinese Social and Political Review*, Peking, vol. xii, no. 1, Jan., 1928, pp. 116-129) illustrates from another field the type of synthesis here suggested. Professor Taylor, thoroughly familiar with the rural problems of China through long experience and study, has made a careful investigation of the rural cooperative movement in Denmark. Basing his conclusions on a knowledge of the structure of Chinese village life and on the methods and problems of Chinese agriculture, as well as on his research and study of the origin, history and present operation of Danish rural cooperation, he proposes a definite scheme of Chinese rural reconstruction.

In like manner, the International Famine Relief Commission in Peking, after a careful study of the economic conditions and social organization in famine areas, adapted the German *Raiffeisen* system of cooperative credit to Chinese needs. These cooperative societies are steadily increasing in number and are affording much needed relief to the farmers from the hitherto excessively high loan rates.

An illustration from the governmental field of such synthesis is the

4: Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12

A. The Values of the Guild System

Without re-emphasizing[1] the socially harmful aspects and inherent limitations of these ancient institutions, certain of the values or socially beneficial features of guild life at its best may be summarized as follows:

1. Personal face-to-face relationship in local shops or stores that made possible friendly understanding between masters, journeymen and apprentices.

2. The relatively easy adjustment of difficulties between the employer and the employees and the absence of any considerable amount of class strife.

3. The equalization of opportunity afforded by the guild system for the capable to pass through the apprentice and journeymen stages to the position of master.

continuance under a Republican system of the Board of Censors composed of aged and respected officials who restrain and advise those actually in control of the Peking Government. The advocacy by the Peoples Party of the "Committee System" of government control corresponding to the village and town method of control by groups of elders and gentry, is another illustration of the incorporation of a very old and familiar governmental method in a Western-style political system. The plan of rotating chairmen in this Committee System is similar to that of guild organization.

The aim of the progressive Chinese leaders of the Christian Church is to create an "indigenous Church." Forms and ceremonies out of harmony with China's structural heritage are being discarded, and adaptations in Church organization and modes of worship are being made.

The necessity for reorganizing the educational system, which has been largely a direct copy from the West, and of adapting education to China's needs is recognized by such progressive educators as Dr. Chiang Men Lin, formerly Chancellor of the National Government University in Peking.

Remarkable efficiency and ingenuity in combining Chinese educational material with efficient Western educational method have been manifested by James Y. C. Yen and his corps of Western-trained Chinese educators in the Mass Education Movement, which in its organized classes throughout the provinces has enrolled over two million persons for the study of textbooks based on one thousand selected characters.

[1] *Cf.* p. 213.